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Financial sector reforms have been undertaken by many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and one of the key targets of these reforms has been investment. This study conducts an 
empirical investigation of the effect of financial sector reforms on private investment in 
selected Sub-Saharan African countries. An index is developed which tracks the gradual 
progress made with implementation of the phases of the reforms. The results of econometric 
estimations show that financial sector reforms (measured by the index) have had a positive 
effect on private investment in the selected countries, thus offering support to the financial 
liberalization hypothesis. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) embarked upon series of financial 
sector reforms from the mid 1980s into the 1990s. The reforms were supposed to reduce 
government intervention in financial markets and reverse the ill-effects of the repressive 
policies embarked upon by SSA governments upon attaining political independence. The 
financial systems were characterized by heavy government intervention, including 
government’s acquisition of existing banks or setting up new ones. There was also an 
active policy of keeping interest rates low, and directed credit allocation to priority 
sectors. These measures by the governments resulted in stifling of savings and granting 
of credit not based on commercial criteria, while the financial systems were generally 
hampered from developing, thereby preventing them from efficiently matching savers’ 
funds with the most efficient users. The financial systems in SSA were also 
characterised by high intermediation costs, weak resource mobilisation, low and often 
negative real interest rates, and excessive government borrowing. They also had a large 
 
* All errors are the responsibility of the author.
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portfolio of unpaid loans. SSA countries experienced lower financial depth when 
compared with other regions. 
It was in a bid to address these deficiencies in their financial systems that the 
governments initiated financial sector reforms. These reforms focused on abolishing of 
directed credit allocation, interest rate liberalization, bank restructuring and privatization, 
and strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision. These were expected to 
stimulate and accelerate economic growth, with investment acting as one of the main 
transmission mechanisms. It is expected that with the reforms, liberalized interest rates 
will encourage savings, and increased bank deposits will make more credit available for 
investment. Consequently, investment will increase and as financial intermediaries 
allocate resources to the most efficient investments economic growth will rise. Evidence 
of a strong positive relationship between economic growth and investment reported by 
studies on SSA tends to justify this optimism. These studies include Seck and El Nil 
(1993), Oshikoya (1994), Matsheka (1998), Calamitsis et al. (1999), Gyimah-Brempong 
and Traynor (1999), Asante (2000), Ndikumana (2000), and Hoeffler (2002). A major 
drawback of these studies is that none measured the gradual institutional changes 
involved with financial sector reforms. Rather, they focused on indicators such as the 
real interest rate thus neglecting other reform measures. Any analysis of financial sector 
reforms that does not take full account of this plethora of policies will not provide useful 
insight into how financial reforms have affected investment, and will suffer from 
omitted variable bias (Gibson and Tsakalatos, 1994, p. 596; Demetriades and Luintel, 
1996, p. 366).   
This paper is concerned with conducting an empirical analysis of the effects of 
financial sector reforms on private investment in SSA countries. The paper is important 
for a number of reasons. First, it improves upon previous empirical research by using a 
broad and more comprehensive data set on financial sector reforms. This is done by 
developing an index of the reforms, which takes into account the initial conditions at 
commencement of the reforms, and characterizes the sequencing of various reform 
measures. This index is then included in private investment equations to determine the 
effect of financial reforms on private investment and because we make use of this index 
of financial reforms, our results will provide a more robust analysis of the impact of 
financial reforms on private investment than earlier studies have done. Second, this 
study utilizes data for a broad set of SSA countries and thus tests for the robustness of 
earlier studies. While studies such as Hermes and Lensink (2005) have utilized such a 
liberalization index for a group of emerging market economies, it would be particularly 
insightful to separate SSA countries to see if the conclusions from such broad studies 
hold. This is because authors such as Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) found that when 
countries are separated according to their regions, the effect of financial liberalization on 
macroeconomic variables weakens substantially. Third, many studies on investment 
have been criticized because of endogeneity of the regressors. We have taken account of 
such endogeneity concerns by using the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond 
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2.  LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
The theory of financial liberalization advocates the freeing up of financial markets to 
reverse the detrimental effects of financial repression. Financial repression is a regime 
consisting of the imposition of interest-rate ceilings, directed credit allocation policies, 
high reserve requirements, foreign exchange regulations, and heavy taxation of the 
financial sector. Financial repression keeps interest rates artificially low and investable 
funds are rationed based on non-market criteria such as political clout, friendship, loan 
size, and benefits accruable to bank officials. Such criteria result in low investment, and 
an inefficient allocation of funds between investment projects. Such financial repression 
was manifested in several countries in the form of ceilings on interest rates, directed 
credit to priority sectors, and a small number of banks which were mainly government 
owned and very inefficient.   
Broadly speaking, financial liberalization encompasses those policies aimed at 
freeing financially “repressed” economies from the effects of such growth-retarding 
financial policies as noted above. Liberalization tends to reverse such policies, through 
interest rate deregulation, directed credit abolishment, bank restructuring and 
privatization, enhanced prudential regulation, and deepened supervision. With financial 
liberalization, it is expected that savings will become more attractive and increase, 
thereby making more credit available, and this will promote greater investment. It is also 
expected that reducing reserve requirements makes more loanable funds available to 
banks, and consequently, rate and level of investment can increase. Furthermore, the 
granting of more banking licences and the subsequent increase in competition will 
encourage banks to be more predisposed to providing better services, and this will attract 
more customers and investors. The removal of credit restrictions under financial 
liberalization policies will also increase the lending capabilities of banks. 
Criticisms of the financial liberalization theory include the neostructuralists (van 
Wijnbergen, 1983; Taylor, 1983) who noted that financial liberalization can cause a 
decline in investment efficiency if it causes a shifting of resources from the formal to the 
informal financial sector. Informal financial markets are more efficient in allocating 
credit because they, unlike formal intermediaries, are not subject to reserve requirements 
which reduce the amount of credit provided by banks. This may mean they (informal 
intermediaries) can allocate credit more efficiently. Lensink (1996) notes that in SSA 
countries informal financial intermediaries do virtually all financing of investment 
projects and so liberalizing the formal financial markets will not really enhance credit 
allocation. On the contrary, it could cause a shifting of resources from the informal to 
formal markets and result in a fall in both the quantity and quality of investment.   
We provide a brief overview of empirical studies of the relationship between 
investment and financial liberalization in SSA below. 
Oshikoya (1992) investigated how interest rate deregulation has affected investment 
in Kenya over the period 1970-1989. The dependent variable is the private investment 
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interest, changes in terms of trade, public investment ratio, inflation rate, and the lagged 
debt service ratio. The author found that the real rate of interest is significantly 
positively related to the private investment rate thus offering support to the financial 
liberalization hypothesis. The other variables －inflation rate, terms of trade, and 
external debt service payments have negative and significant coefficients. The 
coefficient on the public investment ratio is positive and significant, thus implying that 
public investment is complementary to private investment. 
Dailami and Walton (1992) examined the behavior of private investment in 
Zimbabwe over the period 1970 to 1987. The dependent variable is private investment and 
the explanatory variables are: GNP growth, relative price of capital goods, the real interest 
rate, the real effective exchange rate, real wage, the lagged dependent variable, and the 
real UK government bond yield. The results showed that private investment is positively 
related to GNP growth, real interest rate, real effective exchange rate, and the lagged 
dependent variable, and negatively related to the government bond yield, relative price of 
capital goods, and real wage. These results support the financial liberalization hypothesis.     
Seck and El Nil (1993) examined how financial liberalization has affected 
investment in Africa using data for twenty one countries over the period 1974 to 1989. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of gross investment to GDP. Explanatory variables 
are real deposit rate of interest, nominal deposit rate, inflation rate, current account ratio, 
and growth in the M2 ratio. The effect of the real rate of interest and growth in the M2 
ratio are positive and significant thus implying that financial liberalization has improved 
investment in these African countries.   
Oshikoya (1994) examined the determinants of private investment in eight African 
countries for the period 1970-1988. The results show that the growth rate of real GDP, 
the public investment ratio, and the availability of credit all have a positive impact on 
private investment. The debt service ratio has a negative effect on private investment.   
Matsheka (1998) estimated an investment function for Botswana for the period 
1976-1995. The dependent variable is the real level of domestic investment. Explanatory 
variables are the real deposit interest rate, real private sector credit, the lagged 
accelerator (past level of demand), a dummy variable for 1987/88 that captures the effect 
of the decline in investment. The results showed a positive and significant coefficient for 
private sector credit and the lagged accelerator, while other variables are insignificant. 
Using a two-step Engle-Granger method, Jenkins (1998) estimated a model of 
private investment flows for Zimbabwe using annual data over the 1969-1990 period. 
The results show that in the long-run, gross profits have positive effects, while foreign 
capital inflows and the external debt-to-GDP ratio negatively affect private investment. 
In the short run, the availability of foreign exchange and the relative price of industrial 
output have positive effects, while the change in the relative cost of capital is negatively 
related to the cost of capital. 
Moshi and Kilindo (1999) conducted an empirical study on the role of government 
policy on private investment in Tanzania using data over the period 1970-1992. The 
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private investment and GDP growth, private sector credit, and public investment. The 
authors used another specification where public investment was split into central 
government investment and parastatal sector investment. The estimated results showed 
that all the variables were positive and statistically significant with the exception of 
central government investment which was significantly negative, thus providing 
evidence of crowding-out. 
Ndikumana (2000) examined the financial determinants of domestic investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The study employs panel data for thirty countries over the period 
1970-1995. The results indicate a positive relationship between both total and private 
investment and 3 indicators of financial development, while credit to the public sector is 
negative and significantly related to investment. When control variables are included in 
the regressions, the results show that investment is negatively related to the debt service, 
debt stock, the black market premium, and inflation. Investment is positively related to 
per capita GDP growth and international trade flows. The author concludes that financial 
factors are important in determining domestic investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
that strong financial development leads to high future investment levels, with private 
investment reacting more strongly than total investment. 
Akpokodje’s (2000) sought to explore the association between export earnings 
fluctuations and capital formation in Nigeria over the period 1960-1995. The 
explanatory variables were savings, output, and the rate of interest. The authors found a 
significant positive relationship between capital stock and savings and output. The 
interest rate was negative and statistically insignificant.         
Asante’s (2000) study sought to examine the determinants of private investment in 
Ghana over the period 1970-1992. The results showed that the variables that had a 
significant positive relationship with investment are: lagged investment, public 
investment, private sector credit, real interest rate, and real exchange rate. Trade, 
political instability, macroeconomic instability, and the growth rate of real GDP have 
had a negative relationship with private investment.     
While these studies have attempted to empirically model the effects of financial 
liberalization on investment in African countries, they have a major drawback which is 
that none measured the gradual institutional changes involved with financial sector 
reforms. Rather, they focused on indicators such as the real interest rate thus neglecting 
other reform measures. Any analysis of financial sector reforms that does not take full 
account of this plethora of policies will not provide useful insight into how financial 
reforms have affected investment, and will suffer from omitted variable bias (Gibson 
and Tsakalatos, 1994, p. 596; Demetriades and Luintel, 1996, p. 366). This study 
improves on these previous studies by using a broad and more comprehensive data set 
on financial sector reforms. This is done by developing an index of the reforms, which 
takes into account the initial conditions at commencement of the reforms, and 
characterizes the sequencing of various reform measures. Thus, our results will provide 
a more robust analysis of the impact of financial reforms on private investment than 
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3.    CONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL REFORMS INDEX 
 
Increasing emphasis is being placed on the fact that variables such as the real interest 
rate or credit provided by banks to the private sector cannot adequately measure the 
variety of financial reforms embarked upon by different countries since the mid-1980s. 
Consequently, different studies have adopted a variety of measures in developing 
indexes that track the different reforms and the varying start dates of different reform 
measures (Bandiera et al., 2000; Laeven, 2000; Bekaert et al., 2001; Arestis et al., 2002; 
Abiad and Mody, 2005; Abiad et al., 2008; Fowowe, 2008). In this study we follow 
Abiad and Mody (2005) in developing an index of financial reforms which measures the 
progression made with different financial reforms. Abiad and Mody (2005) identified six 
different dimensions of financial reforms and each dimension has a scale which ranges 
from 0 to 3. The liberalization measure will have a value of 0 for years in which the 
financial sector is fully repressed, this will increase to 1 if the sector is partially 
liberalized, 2 if the sector is largely liberalized, and 3 if the sector is fully liberalized. 
Thus each liberalization measure can take on values between 0 and 3.
1 This grading is 
adopted for our financial reform index.
2  
We have identified five financial reform measures which are: bank de-nationalisation 
and restructuring, interest rate deregulation, abolishing of direct allocation of credit, 
removal of entry restrictions into banking, and strengthening prudential regulation and 
supervision. We then allocate to each of these measures a value of 0 before the specific 
reform measure is embarked upon. Each measure then takes on higher values ranging 
from 1 which corresponds to partial reforms, to 2 for a largely liberalized sector, and 
finally 3 for a fully liberalized financial sector. This produces a matrix of 5 variables 
corresponding to each financial reform measure with each reform measure having a 
value ranging from 0 to 3 depending on the progress made with reforms.   
Different methods can be used to obtain a summary index of financial reforms and 
these range from adding up all reform measures in any given year with the resulting sum 
giving an index of financial reforms (Laeven, 2000). Other measures include using 
principal components analysis to obtain a summary measure of financial reform 
(Bandiera  et al., 2000) and some authors vary the use of principal components by 
multiplying the eigenvectors of the first component with each reform measure (Shrestha 
and Chowdury, 2006). 
This study makes use of the method of Laeven (2000) where we sum all reform 
 
1  Shrestha and Chowdury (2006) used a different scale from 0 for full repression, 0.33 for partly 
liberalized, 0.66 for largely liberalized and 1 for fully liberalized. We explored this method as well and the 
index obtained was similar to the index presented here.   
2  We also identified the cases of policy reversals and these involved a movement to a lower score 
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measures in any given year to obtain on index of financial reforms (FINDEX1).
3 The 
indexes obtained for the different countries are shown in Figures 1 to 3 and we can 
observe some interesting features of financial reforms in these SSA countries.
4 Firstly,  it 
is seen that the countries proceeded with reforms at different speeds with some countries 
such as Ghana, Gambia, Senegal and Madagascar progressing rapidly with most reforms 
while some countries such as Mauritius, Cameroon, Kenya and Zimbabwe adopted a 
gradual approach to reform of their financial sector. The sequencing of reforms has been 
a hot topic for debate in the aftermath of financial sector reforms with many authors 
arguing for a gradual sequencing of reforms of the financial sector. It can also be seen 
from these figures that some countries such as Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South 
Africa embarked on full liberalization of the reform measures, while some others such as 
Cameroon and Malawi only partially liberalized their financial sectors. This brings into 
focus a key feature of financial reforms carried out in many SSA countries which is the 
varying degrees of commitment and willingness of the authorities, coupled with 
different levels of initial success with reforms which to a large extent influenced 
progress made with financial reforms.   
 
 
Figure 1.    Financial Reform Index in Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana 
 
 
3 We also used the other two techniques of Bandiera et al. (2000) and Shrestha and Chowdury (2006)  
for computing different indexes and the results do not change much from those obtained using the method of 
Laeven (2000), as shown in section 5.3 
4 The study makes use of data for 14 countries which have been selected based on availability of data on 
financial sector reforms and they are: Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.   BABAJIDE FOWOWE  86
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4.  DATA  AND  METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1.  Model  Specification 
 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the effect of financial reforms on private 
investment in selected SSA countries. Consequently, the primary variable of interest is 
the index which is developed to measure different financial reforms. Similar to other 
studies (Asante, 2000) we include other variables in the private investment equation 
based on the accelerator theory and uncertainty variables.   
Financial reforms are measured using the index of financial reforms (FINDEX1) 
developed in the previous section. The inclusion of this variable in a model of 
investment is premised on the financial liberalization hypothesis which postulates that 
liberalization reverses the ill effects of financial repression and stimulates savings and 
investment. The theory therefore predicts a positive effect of financial sector reforms on 
investment. If financial reforms have succeeded in improving private investment, this 
index (FINDEX1) should have a positive coefficient.   
Output growth has been the most consistent and significant determinant of 
investment found by other studies. The accelerator theory makes investment a function 
of changes in output. In this theory, planned investment is seen as brought about by 
changes in demand, and so changes in aggregate demand for consumer goods will cause 
changes in demand for capital goods. The flexible accelerator theory is based on the 
assumption that there is a fixed relationship between the level of output and the desired 
capital stock in the economy. Then investment is a linear function of changes in output. 
Thus, if national income is growing, investment will also grow; and a fall in national 
income will also cause a fall in investment. We measure output growth by the growth in 
real GDP. 
Public investment is included in our model and it highlights the importance of the 
government providing a conducive environment for investment to take place. The 
relationship between private and public investment is theoretically ambiguous. An 
increase in public investment can have either a positive or negative effect on private 
investment. On the one hand, public investment can raise private investment in a 
situation where resources are not fully employed. In such a case, income would increase 
following an increase in public investment and this increased income would send 
positive signals to private investors that they can increase their profit margins by 
investing more. On the other hand, however, public investment will be a substitute for 
private investment if it is financed through inflation or debt issues. Public investment 
can also be detrimental to private investment if the goods produced by the public sector 
compete directly with private sector produced goods. Thus, this crowding out of private 
investment by public investment makes them substitutes. The exact relationship between 
private and public investment can only be ascertained empirically.   
The irreversible nature of investment and its relationship with macroeconomic 
uncertainty has attracted considerable attention in the literature in recent years BABAJIDE FOWOWE  88
(Aizenmann and Marion, 1993; Serven, 1997, 1998). Because investment is irreversible, 
investors watch out for signs of uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment and if 
they perceive that the economy is too volatile or dangerous for investment, they will 
desist from investment. Inflation volatility is included to take account of macroeconomic 
uncertainty. High rates of inflation send out a signal that the government is unable to 
manage the economy properly and is a sign of instability. There is also the possibility 
that the actions of the government in attempting to control inflation through 
contractionary policies might depress demand and this would result in a fall in 
investment. High and unpredictable inflation rates can be portrayed by investors as a 
sign that the government is losing control of the economy and thus discourage investor 
confidence. We measure the volatility of inflation in each year with a 3-year rolling 
standard deviation of the inflation rate (Serven, 1997; Bo, 2006; Veiga and Aisen, 2006).   
Following from the above discussion we arrive at a model of the quantity of private 
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where PRIVATE=ratio of gross private investment to GDP, FINDEX1=index of 
financial reforms, GDPGROW=growth rate of GDP, PUBLIC=ratio of gross public 
investment to GDP, VOLINFL=volatility of inflation. 
 
4.2.    Estimation Procedure and Data 
 
In order to exploit the time series and cross section dimension of our data set, panel 
data has been used to estimate Equation (1). Panel data have been proposed as a better 
econometric technique for use in cross-country regressions because it allows for the 
inclusion of country-specific and because it exploits the time series dimension of the 
data thereby giving greater degrees of freedom. We will make use of the fixed effects 
estimator which allows us to model the unobserved country specific effects as fixed 
parameters to be estimated. To control for potential endogeneity bias we will make use 
of the system GMM estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Endogeneity 
can arise due to the propositions of the crises-reform hypothesis where adverse 
economic conditions bring about reforms (Drazen and Easterly, 2001). It would then be 
useful to control for reverse causation in this investment model which might run from 
adverse investment performance to induce financial reforms.   
We have an unbalanced panel data ranging from 1980 to 2006. The sample period 
has been selected based on data availability and data sources are African Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 2008/09, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2008, and 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM 2007.   
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5.  DISCUSSION  OF  RESULTS 
 
5.1.  Baseline Specification 
 
We have first presented average values of private investment before and after 
financial liberalization in Table 1. It is seen from this table that investment increased 
after liberalization in most of the countries under study. Specifically, investment 
increased in 10 countries which are: Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe; while it fell in 4 countries: Botswana, 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and South Africa. This suggests that broadly speaking, 
financial liberalization has improved private investment in SSA countries. The rate of 
change of investment after liberalization varied in different countries. In some countries 
such as Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe, investment changed by less than a 
percentage point while the rate of change was higher in some other countries such as 
Botswana, Gambia and Ghana where investment changed by over 5 percentage points 
after liberalization. The table also shows that most of the countries in which investment 
changed by a higher percentage actually witnessed an increase in investment, thus 
supporting the earlier observation that the cursory examination of the data suggests that 
financial liberalization has improved private investment in the countries under study.   
 
 
Table 1.    Average Investment Ratios Before and After Liberalization 
Country  Average Private Investment 
Pre-Liberalization (%) 
Average Private Investment 
Post-Liberalization (%) 
Botswana 19.15  14.10 
Cameroon 14.17  13.36 
Cote d'ivoire  9.04  6.72 
Gambia 6.79  12.36 
Ghana 3.92  10.05 
Kenya 10.74  11.70 
Madagascar 4.05  8.74 
Malawi 7.04  7.07 
Mali 9.39  13.78 
Mauritius 15.10  18.38 
Senegal 13.79  16.19 
South Africa  19.52  14.76 
Uganda 5.31  11.58 
Zimbabwe 13.96  14.75 
 
 
The results of estimating the private investment equations are presented in Table 2 
and it can be seen that the coefficient on the financial reform index (FINDEX1) is 
significant positive. The implication of this is that the financial sector reforms have had BABAJIDE FOWOWE  90
a positive effect on private investment. The fixed effects estimates show that financial 
reforms have increased private investment by 0.2 percentage points. The dynamic GMM 
result, with a coefficient of 0.52, indicates a slightly higher effect of financial reforms on 
private investment. These findings are similar to results obtained by other studies who 
found that financial reforms have contributed to improving private investment. Hermes 
and Lensink (2005) obtained a significantly positive coefficient of 0.3 for their index of 
financial liberalization using data for 25 emerging economies. Ang (2009) found that 
financial repressive policies such as directed credit programmes and high reserve and 
liquidity requirements had a negative effect on private investment in India, thus 
implying that financial liberalization would help in reversing these effects and help to 
stimulate investment. These results find theoretical support from the financial 
liberalization hypothesis where the implementation of various financial reforms such as 
interest rate deregulation and strengthening of prudential regulation leads to increased 
savings, thereby making more credit available, and this will consequently lead to an 
increase in investment. Furthermore, financial reforms also include reduction or 
elimination of directed credit requirements and this makes more loanable funds available 
to banks and consequently, investment can increase after liberalization. In addition to 
this, Nagano (2005) found that investment from external sources is low in the 
developing economies of East Asia. This is attributed to relatively low development of 
financial markets in these countries and our results show that if financial markets are 
liberalised, this enhances the development of financial markets and consequently, 
private investment increases.     
The results in Table 2 show that private and public investments have had a negative 
relationship in these SSA countries. The GMM coefficient of public investment implies 
that a percentage point increase in public investment is associated with a reduction in 
private investment of 0.26 percentage points. This result would suggest that private and 
public investment, rather than being complements are substitutes. This confirms the 
findings of Looney and Frederiken (1997) who found that in Pakistan, public investment 
crowds out private investment in non-manufacturing and small-scale manufacturing 
activities. For large-scale manufacturing activities, public investment on rural works, 
post offices and rail-roads had a marginal effect in promoting private investment while it 
was only public investment in energy that significantly stimulated private investment. 
Our results have important implications for these SSA countries because it shows that 
the public investments of various governments have not provided a suitable environment 
for private investment. This calls for a re-thinking and redirection of future public 
investment if these countries are to achieve faster growth rates since evidence suggests 
that private investment has improved economic growth more than public investment 
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Table 2.    Panel Estimates of Private Investment Equation 
Variable Fixed  Effects  SYS-GMM 
Constant 10.93  10.79 
 (14.32)***  (5.55)*** 
Findex1 0.21  0.52 
 (3.86)***  (2.14)** 
Ygrow 0.17  0.14 
 (3.45)***  (1.81)* 
Public -0.06  -0.26 
 (-0.72)  (-2.03)* 
Volinfl -0.03  -0.02 
 (-2.06)**  (-1.26) 
Diagnostic Tests     
Sargan Test    [0.514] 
Second Order Serial Correlation Test   [0.231] 
Number of Countries  14  14 
Number of Observations  360  360 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of private investment to GDP. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios and 
figures in square brackets are p-values. All coefficients have been rounded to two decimal places. * 
indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** 
significant at the 1% level. T-ratios are from Windmeijer corrected standard errors. 
 
 
The negative effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on private investment are 
supported in Table 2 where we find an inverse relationship between private investment 
and inflation volatility. This is similar to the results of other studies such as Greene and 
Villanueva (1991), Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) who found that inflation has a 
negative effect on investment and this highlights the importance of a stable 
macroeconomic environment to attract investment. In the fixed effects estimation the 
coefficient of output growth is significantly positive, and this supports the accelerator 
theory. Our results agree with most other studies in which output growth has been the 
most consistent and significant determinant of investment. The coefficient on growth in 
the fixed effects estimation is 0.17 and this implies that an increase in output growth by 
10 percentage points will lead to an increase in investment of 1.7 percentage points. This 
implies that holding other factors constant, output would have to grow by a very large 
proportion before sufficient investment can be attracted. Specifically, an average 
economy in SSA would have to grow from say, 5% to15% to stimulate an increase in 
investment from say, 2% to 3.7%.   
 
5.2.    Robustness Checks with Alternative Estimators 
 
We have conducted a number of alternative estimations to test the robustness of our 
results. Firstly, we estimated Equation (1) using a least squares and random effects BABAJIDE FOWOWE  92
estimator and the results are presented in Table 3. The results from Table 3 are 
consistent with those from Table 2 and we find that financial reforms, irrespective of the 
estimation technique employed have had a positive effect on private investment. Both 
the least squares and random effects coefficient on the financial reform index are 0.21, 
which is the same as the one obtained with the fixed effects estimator. These results 
further corroborate the conclusions from Table 2 that financial reforms in these SSA 
countries have improved private investment. The results for the other coefficients in 
Table 3 agree with those from Table 2. We still have a positive relationship between 
investment and output growth, thus supporting the accelerator theory. Also, both public 
investment and inflation volatility have negative coefficients, thus corroborating the 
findings obtained from Table 2.   
 
 
Table 3.    Alternative Estimates of Private Investment Equation 
Variable OLS  Random  Effects 
Constant 12.55  11.08 
 (17.55)***  (10.9)*** 
Findex1 0.21  0.21 
 (3.41)***  (3.81)*** 
Ygrow 0.29  0.18 
 (5.00)***  (3.57)*** 
Public -0.35  -0.09 
 (-4.75)***  (-1.19) 
Volinfl -0.04  -0.03 
 (-2.28)**  (-2.11)** 
Number of Countries  14  14 
Number of Observations  360  360 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of private investment to GDP. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios and 
figures in square brackets are p-values. All coefficients have been rounded to two decimal places. * 
indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** 
significant at the 1% level. T-ratios are from Windmeijer corrected standard errors. 
 
 
5.3.    Robustness Checks with Alternative Indexes of Financial Reforms 
 
As was mentioned previously there are different methods of deriving a summary 
index of financial reforms and our analysis above has relied on one of such methods in 
arriving at the index of financial reform (FINDEX1). In this section we derive 2 other 
indexes of financial reforms using different methods and include these indexes in 
investment equations. To derive the first alternative index we follow Bandiera et al. 
(2000) in using principal components analysis and the index of financial reforms is the 
value of the first principal component which is denoted by (FINDEX2). For all countries 
the first principal component explains over 75 percent of the variation. The second FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT    93
alternative index is also derived using principal components analysis but in this case we 
follow Shrestha and Chowdury (2006) in multiplying the first eigenvector by each 
financial reform measure and adding for all reforms. The index computed using this 
method is denoted by FINDEX3. When these indexes are separately included in 
investment equations the results are presented in Table 4.   
 
 
Table 4.    Alternative Estimates of Private Investment Equation 
Variable Fixed    Effects SYS-GMM Fixed  Effects SYS-GMM 
Constant  11.96 12.98  10.98 10.89 
 (18.18)*** (8.62)*** (14.4)*** (5.73)*** 
Findex2 0.36  1.28     
 (3.27)*** (2.54)**     
Findex3     0.43  1.08 
     (3.76)*** (2.11)** 
Ygrow  0.17 0.15  0.17 0.14 
 (3.4)*** (1.97)*  (3.43)*** (1.82)* 
Public  -0.05 -0.25  -0.06 -0.27 
  (-0.59) (-1.98)* (-0.72) (-2.08)* 
Volinfl  -0.03 -0.04  -0.03 -0.02 
 (-2.29)**  (-2.36)**  (-2.04)  (-1.23) 
Diagnostic  Tests      
Second Order Serial 
Correlation Test 
  [0.252]  [0.502] 
Number  of  Countries  14  14 14 14 
Number of Observations  360  360  360  360 
Notes: Dependent variable is the ratio of private investment to GDP. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios and 
figures in square brackets are p-values. All coefficients have been rounded to two decimal places. * 
indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and *** 
significant at the 1% level. T-ratios are from Windmeijer corrected standard errors. 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the results from Table 2 are robust with respect to 
alternative financial reform indexes. The coefficients of the 2 alternative reform indexes 
(FINDEX2 and FINDEX3) are still significantly positive and the conclusion that 
financial reforms have led to improved private investment can still be upheld despite the 
use of different indexes of financial reforms. For the second index (FINDEX2), the fixed 
effects estimate is 0.36 while the system GMM coefficient is 1.28 while corresponding 
estimates for the third index are 0.43 and 1.08. It is evident from the foregoing that 
financial sector reforms have had the desired effect on private investment, that is, they 
have had a positive effect on private investment.   
For the other variables in the model the results are still similar to those obtained from 
Table 2 where output growth is positively related to private investment and both public BABAJIDE FOWOWE  94
investment and inflation volatility have had a negative effect with private investment. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) embarked upon series of financial 
sector reforms from the mid 1980s into the 1990s. These reforms focused on abolishing 
of directed credit allocation, interest rate liberalization, bank restructuring and 
privatization, and strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision. It is expected 
that with the reforms, liberalized interest rates will encourage savings, and increased 
bank deposits will make more credit available for investment. This study improved upon 
previous empirical research by developing a broad and more comprehensive data set on 
financial sector reforms which was then included in private investment equations to 
determine the effect of financial reforms on private investment.   
The results of econometric estimations showed that private investment has had a 
positive relationship with financial sector reforms in SSA. This finding was robust to 
different estimation techniques and alternative indexes of financial sector reforms. These 
results confirm the financial liberalization hypothesis which advocates financial reforms 
to stimulate investment. The results also showed that private and public investment, 
rather than being complements are substitutes in the selected SSA countries. The 
accelerator theory is supported with the finding of a positive coefficient for output 
growth and also, the negative effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on private 
investment are supported as we find an inverse relationship between private investment 
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